Organized Crime In Latin America

Addressed to a terrorist group funding sources and media supplies also increasingly targeting the drug cartels that do business with, either as a source of income or weapons. Addressed to a terrorist group, the key to leadership may be even more essential that the orientation of the direction of a drug cartel and its leadership can be replaced easily and quickly, the leadership of a terrorist or guerrilla is not as difficult to substituted. Although there was sufficient information to document suspicion of drug trafficking activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in Latin America, the Islamic extremist groups operating in the region seem to derive large amounts of money from various illegal activities, such as getting a "tax" in the Muslim and Arab businessmen, involved in smuggling and illicit trafficking of arms and the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) transactions, and so on. The strong participation of the Colombian and Peruvian guerrilla and terrorist paramilitary organizations in drug trafficking is evident. Brazil The Brazilian authorities have estimated that more than $ 6 billion a year in illegal funds are laundered in the tri-border region.

In Argentina, Ramon Mestre, admitted that the tri-border region has given "logistical support to terrorist organizations by providing money to groups that operate in other parts of the world." He said that activities such as illegal immigrants and drug trafficking in the region "are elements that are somehow linked to terrorism ...." It is estimated that 1.5 tons of cocaine per month are exported. Every evening, a dozen armored trucks loaded with laundered money leave Ciudad del Este in Foz do Iguaçu, the Brazilian city on the opposite side of the border. According to Blanca Madani, co-president of the World Amazigh Action Coalition (WAAC), Hizballah, in addition to the estimated $ 60 to $ 100 million per year it receives from Iran and also relies heavily on funding from the diaspora the Lebanese Shiite? West Africa, the United States, and most importantly TRIBORD Region of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. In early January 1998, the Brazilian newspaper quoted the State of São Paulo journalist Hernan Lopez Accago [name as transliterated], who has just published a book on drug and weapons smuggling in the region TRIBORD, in the sense that many employers in the region to pay what amounts to a war tax armed Arab groups in the region.

This money is used to finance military operations in various parts of the world. During 1999-2001, the Islamic extremist groups received at least $ 50 million Arab residents in the area of ​​Foz do Iguaçu, Paraná, through the feet, the traffic on the Bridge of Friendship of Paraguay reflects Muslim financial institutions, people, banks and exchange houses. The U.S. and the governments of Paraguay was evidence that the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian group Hamas funding group received the Arab residents of Foz do Iguaçu. Paraguay's Interior Minister Julio Cesar Fanego was quoted as saying: "We have verified the remittance of money [to Arab extremist groups]. I'm pretty sure there are people linked to Hezbollah in the region TRIBORD.... The exact figure is probably somewhere between $ 50 and $ 500 million. "The minister explained that most of the money transfer operations involving very small amounts of money, between $ 500 and $ 2000.66 The joint Paraguayan-US agencies safety of Brazil stated that the financial aid offered in 2000 by groups of the region for Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, a total of $ 261 million.

The report identified the strengthening of the influence of organized crime networks in the triangle made up of various nationalities, Colombians, Brazilians, Chinese, Lebanese, Nigerians, Russians, Ghana, and people of Ivory Coast. These groups are active in Paraguay and along the route of drug trafficking from Colombia to the United States and Europe. The report notes that most of these covert operations taking place in Ciudad del Este, considered a regional hub for drug trafficking and arms smuggling. The participation of most barter transactions by Colombian drug arms armed rebel groups. The Brazilian figure of $ 261 million for financial support to terrorist groups in 2000 made a report released by the government of Bolivia in November 2001 seems an understatement. According to the report of Bolivia, over 250 million dollars of drug money was taken from suspected Brazil to a Lebanese bank, through Bolivia, during the previous seven years. Ramiro Montealegre Rivas, director of the Finance Unit of Bolivia, said there are "indications of a link between arms traffickers, drug traffickers and international terrorists." The Brazilian authorities were investigating 10 Lebanese citizens who live there are allegedly involved in money laundering.

On October 2, 2001, Mazen Ali Saleh Lebanese born and Saleh Mahmoud Fayad or Salher (Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad's brother), both 20, were arrested in Ciudad del Este, in possession of documents indicating regular remittances from $ 25,000 and $ 50,000 to suspected Muslim radicals. Both were linked to Assad Ahmad Barakat, whom investigators suspect of being the head of the Southern Cone to raise funds for Hezbollah. In early December 2001, ABC Color reported that Basilisa Vázquez Román, a prosecutor in Ciudad del Este, for the two months before the investigation had been $ 100 million transfer from Ciudad del Este to Lebanon. According to information provided by the Brazilian press Roman Vazquez, 10 Lebanese citizens who own businesses in Ciudad del Este but live in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, the money sent through banks in Miami and New York to Lebanese banks. According to research, the deposits were made in Ciudad del Este and Chinatrust Citibank branches. Each Lebanese sent approximately $ 6 to $ 10 million. Although Vázquez Román had not determined where the money was the continuation of research and $ 50,000 to suspected Muslim radicals.

Both were linked to Assad Ahmad Barakat, whom investigators suspect of being the head of the Southern Cone to raise funds for Hezbollah. In early December 2001, ABC Color reported that Basilisa Vázquez Román, a prosecutor in Ciudad del Este, for the two months before the investigation had been $ 100 million transfer from Ciudad del Este to Lebanon. According to information provided by the Brazilian press Roman Vazquez, 10 Lebanese citizens who own businesses in Ciudad del Este but live in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, the money sent through banks in Miami and New York to Lebanese banks. According to research, the deposits were made in Ciudad del Este and Chinatrust Citibank branches. Each Lebanese sent approximately $ 6 to $ 10 million. Although Vázquez Román had not determined where the money was the continuation of the investigation. Brazilian states to require more active participation in the "war on terror". Chile Chile has become the fastest growing center in South America after Brazil for international narcotics transshipments and money laundering enterprises.

This may help explain why Islamic money launderers are attracted to the northern Chilean city of Iquique. As pressure from security authorities has increased in the tri-border region, a series of reports, Islamic militants have moved to Iquique. On November 8, 2001, the Chilean government confirmed it was investigating an alleged Arab financial network with terrorist links that may be involved in money laundering in the north. More specifically, the Chilean authorities were investigating firms in Iquique Mohamad Assad Ahmad Barakat (see profile above). Barakat and his countryman Kalil Saleh established two import and export firms in Iquique-Saleh Trading Ltd. and Barakat Ltd., in early June 2001. Another Lebanese, Arafat Ismail, an associate of Saleh runs either businesses.101 At that time, the Minister of Interior of Chile filed a petition for an investigation into the operations of several Lebanese businessmen in Iquique, including Barakat and Ismail Alo Mohamed, was banned from leaving the country because of their alleged involvement in a network that supports Hezbollah. Santiago, reported in early November 2001, detectives from the newly created International Affairs Unit of the Police Intelligence (Jipol) detected at least two partnerships in which Barakat seems to be the lead investor.

Detectives determined that Saleh Trading Ltd is registered in Iquique notary on June 6, 2001, with an initial capital of $ 50,000. A Chilean citizen participated in the association. The second association, the import and export company Barakat Ltd., was registered the next day at the same notary, with an initial capital of $ 20,000. Barakat, who gave Reef Building, Apartment 902, Iquique, such as your address, contributed $ 19,800 to the partnership with John Lecaros Figueroa. The company stated that its goal was to "import and export all kinds of goods, especially apparel and electronics, and participate in any other business that the partners agree, under the free zone area or customs regulations. " Investigators quoted by La Tercera de la Hora, however, confirmed that the money allegedly laundered in Iquique came from Ciudad del Este, with companies in Chile and cover. These activities could reach several million dollars. Barakat acknowledged in an interview with a Chilean newspaper in November 2001, which does business in Chile and the United States (Miami and New York). He also reiterated that "just a supporter of Hezbollah, which sends" $ 400 per year to help the orphans of the war of liberation of southern Lebanon.

"Colombia Compared to the tri-border region, relatively little Islamic terrorist activity has been reported in Colombia, if this first study is any indication. The occasional presence of an Islamic fundamentalist terrorists in Colombia has been reported. These may have been people trying to visit the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or to travel to Maicao, Colombia and on Margarita Island, Venezuela, where there are significant Abed Abdel Aal communities.Mohamed Arab, a leader of Al Qaeda-affiliated Egyptian Islamic Jihad ( Jamaa Islamiyya), was arrested in Colombia in October 1998. He had been in Italy under "surveillance," said Col. Germain Jaramillo Piedrahita, the head of Colombia's intelligence police, who was interviewed by Radio Caracol in Colombia 21 in October 1998. Abdel Aal is wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in two terrorist killings of tourists: the Jamaa Islamiyya terrorist attack in Luxor, Egypt on November 17, 1997, in which 62 people were killed, and in relation with an incident in which terrorists killed 20 Greek tourists by raking fire gunshots outside their hotel in Cairo on April 18, 1996.

On December 22, 1999, the Iranian Embassy in Bogota, said that Tehran has suspended the construction of a slaughterhouse and meatpacking plant in the demilitarized zone in Colombia. Colombian Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramirez had expressed concern in late November Iranian military advisors were in the group installing the slaughterhouse, and that these Iranians were somehow connected to the FARC, which controlled the DMZ . An Iranian delegation first visited the area in June 1999 and signed an agreement between local government and the Islamic Republic on 21 October, immediately raising suspicions about the installation of a large plant in a area can not meet export requirements. Colombia suspected Iranian officials in the immediate region that might have been linked to drug trafficking and the FARC. Alleged links between the FARC and Islamic terrorist organizations is an issue that needs more detailed investigation. There have been indications of links between the FARC and Hezbollah and other Islamist groups allegedly operating in the region TRIBORD of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.106 In October 2000, fighting broke Paraguayan police weapons for cocaine between Paraguay ring and the FARC.

At that time, the fight against Paraguayan police arrested a person believed to represent the FARC for possible involvement in the arms-for-cocaine ring between Paraguay and the Colombian terrorist group. In early 2001, Brazilian authorities received information from U.S. intelligence and services to combat crime allegedly saying that the FARC drug trafficking and weapons with Islamic extremists in the region TRIBORD. International cooperation between the FARC and Al Qaeda have been increasingly as a result of the war in Afghanistan. One of the U.S. O Globo told investigators that "... it is likely that there is an alliance. Based on Maicao Hezbollah cells have been using the networks of money laundering, drug trafficking and smuggling in Colombia to hide money subsequently be used to finance terrorist operations around the world. right-wing paramilitary organization known as the AUC (United Self Defense Forces of Colombia), an umbrella group that includes many paramilitary forces in Colombia, has also maintained an interest significant in the drug trade, the expansion of its influence its traditional base in the north to many areas in southern coca-rich formerly controlled by the AUC and the AUC FARC.Las Forces of Córdoba and Urabá groups ( Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá-ACCU) are right-wing paramilitary groups that emerged in the late 1980's to protect the interests of regional elites, with the subtle support of the Colombian military.

His appearance only exacerbates the conflict. The AUC has admitted making up to 70 percent of their income from drug trafficking. Hutchinson said the administrator of the DEA in its March 13, 2002, Congress of several self-defense groups raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations in northern and central Colombia.

Bibes notes that "Interestingly, the right-wing paramilitaries, also known as AUC [AUC] in Colombia, allegedly have strong links with drug trafficking and security forces." According to classified DAS document cited by Bibes, up from Colombia paramilitary leader, Carlos Castaño, is well known as a drug trafficker.128 Bibes said that the FARC in order to sell weapons to drugs and the Caribbean and Panama, has been actively trying to open a corridor in a crop production region to finance the paramilitaries. Estimates of the amount of funds that the ELN, FARC and paramilitary groups to obtain the drug trade vary widely. On August 3, 2001, the Houston Chronicle quoted Alfredo Rangel, a Colombian military analyst, in the sense that the benefits of the drug currently 48 percent of the FARC's total revenue, totaling nearly $ 180 million annually . Colombian government estimates that in 1998 the income of Colombia's guerrilla and paramilitary organizations of the drug trade totaled $ 551 million. Others say the figure is higher.

Rafael Pardo, for example, explains that the FARC took control of coca cultivation in Colombia in the second half of the 1990s "and boosted its revenues to more than 600 million dollars a year, possibly the richest insurgent group in history. " According Bibes, the Colombian guerrillas of stakeholders in the production of illicit drugs and drug trafficking has remained focused primarily on the taxation of coca and cocaine production laboratories. Notes that according to a study by the DEA, the FARC process and export of cocaine to the U.S. In early 1990, one third of the income of the FARC have been derived from poppies. The DEA said on July 9, 1997, the FARC factions raise funds, providing security services to traffickers and charging a fee for each gallon of precursor chemicals, and each kilo of coca leaf and cocaine HCL moving in their region. Some of these groups have helped drug traffickers by storing and transporting cocaine and marijuana in Colombia, and some FARC units in Colombia may be engaged in localized opiate trafficking.

Klaus Nyholm of the United Nations Office on Drugs in Colombia has noted that in some areas, autonomous FARC fronts are closely related to cocaine processing and export, while the FARC fronts in other areas no participation. Of the FARC fronts are involved, the units provide protection to coca growers and traffickers in exchange for a tax estimated at between 10 and 15 percent of the value of the drug. Raul Reyes, a senior FARC official, told the Washington Post: "We are in charge of a tax. We do not do any favors, and we do not make any. If the economic base is coca ... that that tax is not directly to the traffickers, but their intermediaries. In other regions more taxes for farmers, producers of sugar companies. " More specifically, the FARC has a schedule of fees (weight) to provide protection and services to producers and drug traffickers. According to the Armed Forces of Colombia, in October 1999 by the FARC $ 15.70 per kilo of coca paste produced by the laboratories, $ 52.60 per kilo for the production of Chlorhydrate of cocaine, $ 5,263 for laboratory protection, $ 52.60 per hectare for the protection of coca fields, $ 4,210 per hectare for protecting the poppy fields, $ 2,631 each for the safety of runways, $ 10.50 per kilo to protect shipments of cocaine, 20 percent of the value of the shipment for river transportation of precursor chemicals, $ 5,263 each for the protection of the flights of the international drug control, and $ 2,631 each for the protection of national drug flights.

Increasingly, however, receive payment from the FARC's cocaine. According to Nyholm, the tendency of the FARC to receive payment for cocaine has deepened the organization of participation in the drug business. The huge revenues from the drug trade have allowed the Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary forces to be one of the best funds in the world. In the second half of the 1990s, members of the FARC and the ELN reportedly tripled as a result of drug proceeds. Considering that the average income per capita in Colombia in 1995 was $ 1,800, the average annual salary was the guerrillas, according to a British newsletter, $ 65,000. Although it seems unlikely that the average annual salary is $ 65,000 guerrillas about anywhere, there is no doubt that the Colombian guerrillas, at least, earn double the wages of the soldiers. According to Leonardo Gallego, head of Colombia's drug police, the guerrillas can pay his troops the equivalent of $ 300 to $ 400 per month, while professional soldiers in the Colombian military to do a little more than $ 200 a month.

"Drug trafficking and the protection of the guerrillas have become the main source of financial support." The service rendered by the FARC for drug traffickers, Van de Velde said, include "the protection, smuggling and violence against the government pays to earn money to continue operations." He explains: FARC operations with drugs are often coordinated to avoid law enforcement interdiction local and international. They work with the traffickers to advance more sophisticated smuggling traffic and increase opportunities. In exchange for weapons and financial support, protected FARC drug-related clandestine airfields, warn of impending traffickers police or military activity and protect coca plantations and processing laboratories. The FARC often carries out attacks on behalf of traffickers, attacking people and organizations involved in drug trafficking. In December 1998, when the government ordered the withdrawal of the army and police in Switzerland a refuge in size (refers to clearing or demilitarized zone (DMZ), to facilitate dialogue with the FARC, had, officially, 6300 acres planted with coca throughout the 42,000 square kilometers (16,000 square miles) and the demilitarized zone shows no signs of poppy.

During the peace negotiations, the Colombian authorities began receiving information linking some FARC fronts with the management of illicit crops and the processing and marketing of coca base in the DMZ. In May 2000, the security agencies of the FARC accused of issuing special permits to buyers of coca base to enter the DMZ while the imposition of sales prices. In 2000 Colombia had more than 400,000 hectares dedicated to coca, offsetting the eradication efforts, leaving the size unchanged coca crops, according to UN estimates. In that year, coca cultivation in clearing, the FARC until the former demilitarized zone (clearance) of its official dissolution in February 2002, increased from 6,000 hectares to 7,900 hectares, according to the U.S. Embassy .. This area accounted for 6 percent of total Colombian crop. Most of the increase was the result of expansion in the Guaviare growing area that extended into the clearing, while the area of ​​the Macarena, which is entirely within the former FARC enclave, only increased 300 hectares.

General Gustavo Socha, head of the Narcotics Police, was quoted by the Monitoring Service of the BBC in mid-March 2002, stating: In this area [of Vista Hermosa, and San Vicente Highlands] and all the [former] zone detente in general, not one [of coca] leaf was moved without the approval of the guerrillas. What really caught our attention was the fact that increasing the amount of land planted occurred relatively close to the municipalities for which there were very strict control. Therefore, they are demonstrating that what is always said in relation to the increased production and the involvement of the FARC in the business is true. The aerial survey located about 30 airstrips in the DMZ. General Socha said the guerrillas had prepared the runways to accommodate different types of aircraft. "Now we know that the plane was carrying chemicals, weapons and money here landed and took off with shipments of cocaine. If, as we believe, the FARC harvested crops in the last two years, it would be crazy to think that about 80 tons of the alkaloid were processed in this region, "said General Socha Cambio.

In October 2001, six Colombian governmental entities that are part of the Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring (SIMCI) received a full report according to which the areas planted with illicit crops have increased throughout the DMZ.149 maps prepared on the basis Information provided by satellite television surveys and photographs taken from special aircraft left no doubt that coca cultivation in 16,000 hectares surface. This information showed that 12 percent of all reported illicit crops by the satellites are within the demilitarized zone and, according to official figures published in October 2001, 12 percent is equivalent to 144 600 hectares. Satellite signals also showed that in southern Caquetá, outside the area and near the towns of Cartagena del Chaira and Caguán Swirls, another 7,500 hectares are planted with coca. According to government sources, the existence of these plantations now. The FARC is also believed to participate in the cultivation of opium poppy. Satellite images contained in the October 2001 report also revealed the existence of 420 hectares planted with poppy.

After the Taliban fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan banned poppy production, the cartels began to seek new suppliers. Pakistan and Afghan drug traffickers in Colombia came in contact with the Cali cartel, and taught them how to cultivate and process poppy until it is converted into heroin. General Jose Cadena, a former police chief of Colombia, said: Those who brought this problem [of Colombia] were Afghanis and Pakistanis. They entered with tourist visas through Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, and worked here giving instructions for planting. ... They are those who teach the Cali cartel to plant poppy. Most of Colombia's opium poppy cultivation in the departments of Tolima and Huila in the south-central Colombia, near the border with Venezuela in the Sierra de Perija in northern Colombia. Although Colombia is the largest grower of opium poppies in South America, its cultivation traditionally accounts for only about 2 percent of potential opium production worldwide. Colombian police sources have warned that dozens of Afghans using false Pakistani passports have been involved in the development of the illicit cultivation of opium to heroin.

Uruguay A month after the attack on the AMIA (Argentina Israeli Mutual Association) building in Buenos Aires in July 1994, the Brazilian government suspicion began focusing on the city of Chui, Rio Grande do Sul state in southern Brazil on the border with Uruguay. Easy to get to Buenos Aires from Chuy by sea, avoiding border controls. It is part of Chuy in Uruguay, and part is in Brazil. Both parts of the city, each with about 18,000 residents, are divided by a wide avenue. The city has a total of about 1,500 Arab residents. Citing official Brazilian government, Brazil's O Globo Television Network and newspaper reported on August 18, 1994, that a property belonging to the armed group Islamic Unification Party and Amal and Hezbollah group had been detected in the area of ​​Chui. According to reports from Brazil, a distribution point of military weapons such as M-16 and AR-15, grenades, rocket launchers, and was detected. Outraged, the Uruguayan government denounced the report, saying there were subversives among the Arabs living in Uruguay.

The mayor of Chui on the Brazilian side of the border, Mohammed Kasim (also accused of being a Lebanese national with close ties to bin Laden and other terrorists Saudis. The Secret Service questioned the mayor Uruguayan who allegedly helped al Said Hassan Hussein Mukhlis' family after his arrest and visited him in jail. Porto Alegre Zero Hora [Porto Alegre], from September 2, 2001, Jomaa described as the alleged leader of the new "Arab mafia", an organization involved in arms trafficking and drugs, money laundering, and exploitation of undocumented workers. After the September 11 attacks, Jomaa was accused of being secretly in contact with Mukhlis, and given shelter to his wife, Sahar (Sarrah) Mohamed Hassam Hamanra Abud. Forces of the Brazilian Federal Police in Rio Grande do Sul have Jomaa to investigate alleged links to Mukhlis, who had visited in prison. Brazilian authorities seem more concerned, however, charges that Jomaa is a citizen Lebanese and therefore not eligible to hold the post of mayor in Brazil. Jomaa denied any connection to bin Laden, saying he had helped Hamanra and their three children as a humanitarian gesture.













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